On examining the legal documents, we find that the Shiʿi legal position toward other faiths is much harsher and stiffer than that taken by Sunni Muslims. eir law reveals a heightened intolerance to people of other beliefs. e Shiʿi interpretation of the law had no use for the orthodox Sunni mitigation of certain narrow-minded old conceptions. Of the severe rule in the Qurʾan (9:28) that "unbelievers are unclean," Sunni Islam has accepted an interpretation that is as good as a repeal. Shiʿi law, on the other hand, has maintained the literal sense of the rule; it declares the bodily substance of an unbeliever to be ritually unclean, and lists the touching of an unbeliever among the ten things that produce najāsa, ritual impurity. 1 Shiʿis are well known-and, among Westerners, routinely faulted-for their distinctively rigorous norms regarding the activities of non-Muslims within Muslim society. Many of these norms, most notably those that forbid contact between non-Muslims and Muslims and between non-Muslims and foodstuffs intended for Muslim consumption, are predicated upon the belief that non-Muslims are categorically afflicted with a communicable form of impurity.
Over a century after its initial publication and notwithstanding its overt hostility toward Shiʿism, Ignaz Goldziher's brief treatment of this topic in his Introduction to Islamic Theology and Law, a portion of which appears as the epigram of this essay, remains representative of scholarship on the subject. 2 Goldziher and his successors derive their evidence for Shiʿi conceptions of non-Muslims primarily from modern and early modern sources, supplementing the statements of Imāmī legal authorities with first-hand accounts by non-Muslims, especially Jews, who experienced the effects of Shiʿi norms. Scholars routinely begin their discussion of these sources with a citation of Q. 9.28, which they treat as the origin of Shiʿi notions about the contagious impurity of all nonMuslims. Thus, in the passage cited above, Goldziher portrays Shiʿis as clinging to "narrow-minded old conceptions" that their relatively liberal, tolerant, and intellectual-read: proto-Enlightenment-Sunni counterparts wisely abandoned.
The thesis that Shiʿi norms regarding non-Muslims stem directly, if not inevitably, from Q. 9.28 makes sense. Within the literature exam ined by Goldziher and his successors, the statement innamā al-mushrikūna najas un , "truly, the polytheists are impure," functions as the primary justification for non-Muslim impurity and, by extension, Shiʿi norms governing the activity of non-Muslims. 3 A rather different picture, however, emerges when we turn to literature from the formative centuries of Shiʿi Islam, the 2nd/8th through 5th/11th centuries. The earliest of these sources do not consistently regard all non-Muslims to be equivalent in their purity status and do not consistently regard the impurity that afflicts non-Muslims to be contagious. These defining components of the modern Shiʿi doctrine of non-Muslim impurity emerge over time and receive what we might call their "classical" formulation only in the first half of the 5th/11th century. The earliest references to Q. 9.28 as the basis of this doctrine appear in these 5th/11th-century sources, well after the component parts of the doctrine is Zeʾev Maghen, "Strangers and Brothers: e Ritual Status of Unbelievers in Islamic Jurisprudence," Medieval Encounters 12 (2006): 173-223, especially 179-94. Maghen's essay offers a detailed, nuanced, and insightful examination of Shiʿi (and Sunni) norms on our subject, but the key aspects of the following critique of Goldziher's work apply to it as well.
3) All translations in this essay are by the author; translations of the Qurʾan were prepared in consultation with those of Arberry, Dawood, Fakhry, and Paret. "Polytheists" is a convenient yet imprecise translation of the Qurʾanic term mushrikūn, which refers not to those who believe in the existence of multiple gods but rather those who associate demigodlike partners with God; see G. R. Hawting, begin to emerge. The Qurʾanic prooftext thus does not constitute a point of origin for the notion that all non-Muslims suffer from a communicable form of impurity but rather serves as retroactive justification for the validity of this idea.
It is the communicability ascribed to non-Muslim impurity that most distinguishes Shiʿi norms regarding non-Muslims from those of their Sunni counterparts. A variety of early Sunni authorities, after all, also regard non-Muslims to be impure, as do Mālikīs and the primary spokesperson for Ẓāhirism, Ibn Ḥazm. These Sunnis, applying the logic of Q. 9.28 ("truly, the polytheists are impure, so do not let them approach the Sacred Mosque…"), express concern about the presence of non-Muslims in sacred spaces (inside mosques, on prayer mats) and about contact by non-Muslims with sacred objects (the Qurʾan). Some also prohibit the performance of ritual ablutions with the suʾr of nonMuslims; suʾr, water from which a person or animal has drunk or washed and water which contains human or animal saliva or sweat, by definition bears the same purity status as the person or animal associated with it. No classical Sunni authority, however, regards the impurity of non-Muslims as communicable to other objects or people. I am not aware of comparable studies of the Islamic purity system as manifest in Shiʿi sources. With the important exception of their attitudes toward the impurity of nonMuslims, however, the differences between Sunni and Shiʿi understandings of this system appear to be no greater than those disputed among the Sunni schools. For a cursory comparison of Shiʿi, Ḥanafī, and Shāfiʿī purity law, see Hamid Algar, "Cleansing, II. In Islamic Persia," in Encyclopaedia Iranica, ed. Ehsan Yarshater (Costa Mesa, Calif.: Mazda, 1992), 5: 700-702.
implications for Sunnis; indeed, Sunni authorities consistently allow Muslims to eat otherwise unproblematic foods which non-Muslims have prepared. Classical Shiʿi authorities, in contrast, hold that the impurity of non-Muslims is communicable through contact with Muslims and with moist foodstuffs. By tracing the development of Shiʿi attitudes toward food associated with non-Muslims through the 5th/ 11th century, the present study sheds light on the emergence of Shiʿism's distinctive notions regarding non-Muslim impurity. Before turning our attention to statements that ascribe impurity to non-Muslims and their foodstuffs, however, it is helpful to first trace the development of Shiʿi norms regarding the meat of animals ritually slaughtered by Jews and Christians. The Qurʾan, in a passage addressing rules about permitted and prohibited meat, declares that "the food of those who were given the Book is permitted to you" (Q. 5.5), and Sunnis uniformly understand this verse to permit Muslim consumption of meat prepared by Jews and Christians but not, for example, Zoroastrians. Shiʿis, however, come to regard all acts of ritual slaughter performed by non-Muslims as invalid and insist that Q. 5.5 refers solely to "grains and the like." This prohibition of non-Muslim meat is not predicated upon the notion that non-Muslims are impure but rather on the assertion that non-Muslim butchers are incapable of fulfilling the requirement to invoke God's name during the act of slaughter. Nevertheless, the emergence of this prohibition sheds valuable light on the roughly simultaneous emergence of impurity-based prohibitions of other foodstuffs associated with non-Muslims, and I will make the case that the factors underlying these parallel developments are identical.
e invocation of God and the status of non-Muslim acts of ritual slaughter
The earliest attested Shiʿi statement on the subject of non-Muslim meat, found in the Majmūʿ al-fiqh, reads like a typical Sunni text on this matter.
Zayd b. ʿAlī (d. 120/740) reported to me from his father from his grandfath er from ʿAlī [b. Abī Ṭālib (d. 40/660)], peace be upon him, who said, "e meat of animals slaughtered by Muslims is permitted to you if they mentioned the name of God over it, and the meat of animals slaughtered by Jews and Christians is permitted to you if they mentioned the name of God over it, but you may not eat the meat of animals slaughtered by Magians or Arab Christians, for they are not of the People of the Book.
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According to Zayd, ʿAlī regards Jews and Christians as different from other non-Muslims, such as Magians (the term Muslims use for Zoroastrians), on account of their status as recipients of a divine scripture. ʿAlī, moreover, ascribes normative significance to this distinction: Jews and Christians, no less than Muslims, are fit to perform the ritual act of animal slaughter, apparently on account of Q. 5.5's permission of "the food of those who were given the Book."
9 These ideas are entirely in keeping with those espoused in early Sunni sources.
10 Sunni sources also regularly attest to ʿAlī's exclusion of Arab Christians from the category of "People of the Book"; this minority position falls well within the Sunni mainstream and, indeed, is embraced as normative by Shāfiʿīs.
11 ʿAlī emphasizes that the invocation of God is an essential and absolutely required component of the act of animal slaughter (some Sunni authorities are lenient on this matter), 12 but he takes for granted that People of the Book are competent to utter such an invocation. ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib and, it would seem, the late-2nd/8th-century compiler of the Majmūʿ al-fiqh, evidently shared the opinion of the Companions and Successors subsequently endorsed by Sunni authorities, 9) In keeping with Q. 5.5's permission of "the women of those who were given the Book," the Majmūʿ al-fiqh (p. 201, §733) cites ʿAlī as permitting marriage to Jewish and Christian women but not to Magian or polytheistic women; ʿAlī condemns as reprehensible marriage to women from among the Arab Christians and ahl al-ḥarb on the grounds that they are not really People of the Book. namely that Muslims may consume meat prepared by Jews and Christians. Tafsīr gharīb al-Qurʾān, another work ascribed to Zayd b. ʿAlī, similarly glosses the phrase "the food of those who were given the Book is permitted to you" as "the meat of the animals they slaughter (dhabāʾiḥuhum)." 13 The 15 The author excoriates Sunnis for consuming meat prepared by Jews and Christians, warning that such behavior puts Muslims at risk of violating the injunction of Q. 6.121: "Do not eat [meat] from that over which the name of God has not been mentioned; it is indeed a sinful act. The devils inspire their friends to dispute with you; but if you obey them, then you will surely be polytheists." Sunnis, however, blindly trust their Jewish enemies to mention God's name properly when performing the act of ritual slaughter. Sunnis even twist Al-Kulaynī and Ibn Bābawayh also preserve several ḥadīths that permit the consumption of foreign meat; most of these are attributed to Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq, the very authority who reportedly prohibits such meat. Like their restrictive counterparts, however, these tradition s make no distinction between People of the Book and other non-Muslims: Muslims may consume meat prepared by any butcher who invokes God properly. In one such ḥadīth, Abū ʿAbd Allāh explicitly permits ritual slaughter performed by Jews, Christians, Magians, and "all others who dispute the religion [of Islam]" even as he acknowledges that ʿAlī forbade Muslims to eat meat prepared by Magians and Arab Christians. consumption of meat prepared by a Muslim butcher who does not utter the invocation. He explains these rulings by citing Q. 6.118 and Q. 6.121: "Eat from that over which God's name was mentioned … and do not eat from that over which the name of God has not been mentioned."
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These conflicting traditions regarding ritual slaughter reflect the fact that there was no consensus among early Shiʿis regarding the status of non-Muslim meat. Both Ibn Bābawayh, the Imāmī jurist and ḥadīth collector, and al-Nuʿmān b. Muḥammad (d. 363/974), chief jurist of the Fātimid empire and the foremost Ismāʿīlī legal authority, hold Abū Jaʿfar's permissive position to be authoritative: whenever a butcher invokes God's name properly, Muslims may consume the meat he prepares. 24 The Third/ninth-and 4th/10th-century Shiʿi authorities, along with the ḥadīths they cite, offer different bottom lines regarding the permissibility of non-Muslim meat but agree that there is no meaningful distinction between People of the Book and other non-Muslims, the opinions of Sunni authorities and even of ʿAlī himself notwithstanding. These sources attest to a new and distinctly Shiʿi conception of the People of the Book, one in which possession of an authentic scripture is legally insignificant. Whereas Sunnis place Jews and Christians in the middle of a spectrum whose poles are marked by Muslims on the one hand and polytheists on the others, Shiʿis endorse a binary conception of humanity that sets Muslims on one side and all non-Muslims, including Jews and Christians, on the other. 27 Sunnis give voice to their notion that People of the Book are significantly similar to Muslims by permitting Jewish and Christian meat while prohibiting meat prepared by other non-Muslims; they ground this permission in Q. 5.5, "the food of those who were given the Book is permitted to you." Shiʿis give voice to their binary conception of humanity by treating the meat of all nonMuslims in the same manner, choosing instead to focus on Q. 6.118-21. They interpret Q. 5.5 as referring to "food that does not have the breath of life" (the Īḍāḥ), "grain and fruit, to the exclusion of the meat of animals they have slaughtered" (ʿAlī b. Ibrāhīm al-Qummī), or, in various ḥadīths attributed to Abū Jaʿfar and Abū ʿAbd Allāh, "grains and the like." Mālikī and Ḥanbalī opinions regarding the blood-money owed to the relatives of a murder victim vividly demonstrate the existence of this Sunni spectrum of humanity: Jews and Christians are literally worth one-third or one-half the value of Muslims (4000 or 6000 dirhams, not 12,000), whereas Zoroastrians are worth one-fifteenth that value (800 dirhams); see Friedmann, p. 48. Abū ʿAbd Allāh, in contrast, insists that the blood-money owed to relatives of Jewish, Christian, and Zoroastrian victims alike is 800 dirhams; see Another important commonality among 3rd/9th-and 4th/10th-century Shiʿi statements regarding non-Muslim meat is that they consistently focus on the acti ons of non-Muslims. Restrictive authorities express concern that Jewish and, especially, Christian butchers might fail to invoke God or might invoke a being other than God during their act of ritual slaughter. Permissive authorities allow meat prepared by non-Muslim butchers because and on condition that they perform the act of slaughter in accordance with Islamic norms. Fifth/eleventh-century Zaydī and Imāmī authorities, in contrast, emphasize the beliefs of non-Muslims, not their behaviors. Whereas al-Qāsim forbids the purchase of Jewish and Christian meat on the grounds that Jews and Christians include inappropriate language in their divine invocation, Muʾayyad biʾllah declares such meat prohibited on the grounds that Jews and Christians, like Magians and Muslim apostates, are unbelievers (kuf fār). 29 Framed in this manner, there can be no grounds for permitting non-Muslim meat.
Among Imāmī authorities, the influential jurist and theologian them." 30 The fact that non-Muslim butchers do not believe God to have enjoined the invocation of God as part of the act of slaughter means that even a voluntary invocation on their part cannot fulfill the divine obligation to do so. This fact also points to a more substantive problem with non-Muslim acts of ritual slaughter, which al-Mufīd emphasizes in a treatise entitled The prohibition of ritual slaughter performed by People of the Book: non-Muslims do not truly know God or the divine will, and for that reason they are categorically unfit to invoke God's name. This observation pertains to People of the Book no less than to polytheists: if Jews and Christians possessed accurate knowledge of God and God's will, al-Mufīd observes, they too would reject Trinitarian theology, abstain from wine, and acknowledge the authenticity of Muḥammad's prophecy. 31 For these reasons, an invocation uttered by a non-Muslim has no legal validity and, thus, non-Muslim acts of ritual slaughter are themselves invalid. Non-Muslims, by virtue of the fact that they do not accept Islam, are inherently unfit to prepare meat for Muslim consumption.
Al-Mufīd's focus on the beliefs of the butcher rather than on his behavior accounts for a telling statement regarding meat whose origins are obscure: "One who finds meat in the Muslim market and does not know for certain that the animal was slaughtered by an unbeliever may eat it. One is not obligated to inquire regarding the butcher-the outward appearance of Islam is sufficient to regard the meat as permissible."
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Meat in the (predominantly Sunni) Muslim marketplace might come from an animal slaughtered by a Jew or a Christian; alternatively, the butcher might have been a Sunni whose manifest hostility toward the Imāms renders him, by Shiʿi norms, an apostate unfit to invoke God's name. 33 Al-Mufīd, ex ercising the logic of "don't ask, don't tell," permits Shiʿis to consume such meat so long as they can reasonably assume that the butcher was an orthodox Muslim. Various ḥadīths permit the consumption of meat and related products found in the Muslim marketplace whose preparation may not conform to Islamic norms, but al-Mufīd is the first to express concern specifically about the preparer rather than the method of preparation. 34 In both his permissive and restrictive statements, al-Mufīd displays unprecedented interest in the identity of the butcher: meat known to have been prepared by a Jew or Christian is forbidden because of the butcher's religion, not because the butcher might fail to invoke God or might instead invoke Christ.
Al-Mufīd's arguments regarding ritual slaughter performed by nonMuslims were embraced by his students, ʿAlī b. al-Ḥusayn al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā (d. 436/1044) and Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan al-Ṭūsī (Shaykh al-Ṭāʾifa, d. 460/1067). Al-Murtaḍā summarizes his master's points well: People of the Book "do not regard the invocation of God's name during their acts of ritual slaughter to be required, and it is not traditional for them to invoke God's name during their acts of slaughter. Even when they do invoke God's name, they actually invoke other than God, exalted be He, because they do not know God, on account of their unbelief (kufr)."
35 Al-Ṭūsī, who came to be regarded as the last and greatest of the early Imāmī authorities, authored the definitive expression of Imāmī attitudes toward foreign meat, one that aptly summarizes Zaydī attitudes as well. "Ritual slaughter may not be performed by non-Muslims. Whenever an unbeliever of any sort of unbeliefwhether a Jew, Christian, Magian, or idolater-performs the act of ritual slaughter, whether he mentions God's name during this act or does not mention it, one may not eat the resulting meat." 36 The reason Al-Ṭūsī's two ḥadīth collections-Tahdhīb al-aḥkām and al-Istibṣār, the final pair of the Four Books-contain numerous traditions regarding non-Muslim acts of animal slaughter not found in the earlier compilations, including a striking number of permissive ḥadīths. Al-Ṭūsī, however, contends that because these permissive traditions are outnumbered by restrictive traditions, they must be interpreted as exceptions to the general prohibition of foreign meat. He offers two grounds for permitting otherwise prohibited meat: situations of necessity, when no other food is available, and situations requiring dissimulation. The reason dissimulation might be warranted, al-Ṭūsī explains, is that Sunni opponents of Shiʿism permit the consumption of meat prepared by Jews and Christians. consequently act in forbidden manners. Sources from this transitional phase, including 3rd/9th-and 4th/10th-century works and many of the ḥadīths they contain, express concern about specific practices associated with non-Muslims-their failure to invoke God, their invocation of Christ-and either prohibit all non-Muslim meat on the basis of these concerns or permit all meat not associated with these problematic practices. Fifth/eleventh-century Imāmī authorities endorse the restrictive position of their predecessors yet ground it in subtly but significantly different logic: on account of their false beliefs, non-Muslims are inherently unqualified to invoke God. The logic underlying this categorical prohibition of non-Muslim meat, foreshadowed in a small number of ḥadīths ascribed to Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq (e.g., "none but monotheists may be entrusted with [the invocation of God]"), receives full expression in works by al-Mufīd and his disciples. Each new phase of Shiʿi attitudes toward non-Muslim meat emerges as a result of elevated concern regarding the falsehood of the beliefs ascribed to adherents of other religions. Shiʿi jurists grant this falsehood of beliefs ever increasing normative significance, ultimately coming to regard non-Muslims as intrinsically flawed on account of their beliefs. The same pattern of development, motivated in no small measure by the same insistence on the falsehood of all religions other than Islam itself, manifests itself in the emergence of Shiʿi notions regarding non-Muslim impurity.
e impurity of non-Muslims and the status of their non-meat foodstuffs
The status of non-Muslim meat functions as a legal barometer of evolving Shiʿi attitudes toward the beliefs of non-Muslims: meat prepared by non-Muslim butchers is forbidden to the extent that Shiʿi jurists perceive these non-Muslims to be disinclined toward or inherently incapable of invoking God properly. The status of non-meat foodstuffs associated with non-Muslims also functions as a barometer, in this case one that reflects evolving Shiʿi notions regarding the impurity of nonMuslims. These barometers, moreover, reveal the same three shifts in early Shiʿi thought: (1) from distinguishing between People of the Book and others to treating all non-Muslims alike; (2) from lack of consensus regarding the status of non-Muslim foodstuffs to blanket prohibitions; (3) from prohibitions based on the behavior of non-Muslims to prohibitions based on the beliefs of non-Muslims. The last of these developments, hinted at earlier but only fully elaborated in the early 5th/11th century, links the impurity of non-Muslim foods to the falsehood of non-Muslim religions, the same phenomenon that ultimately accounts for the inability of non-Muslims to perform the act of ritual slaughter. Shiʿi authorities establish this link by mobilizing the Qurʾanic prooftext "truly, the polytheists are impure" (Q. 9.28), understood to mean: truly, non-Muslims, because they are all equivalent to polytheists, suffer a communicable form of intrinsic impurity.
Third/ninth-and 4th/10th-century sources offer strong indications that early Zaydī authorities regarded only certain non-Muslims as impure. Zayd b. ʿAlī and al-Qāsim b. Ibrāhīm both speak of the impurity associated with "polytheists" (mushrikūn), a category of nonMuslims which Zayd associates with Magians but contrasts with Jews and Christians. 39 Aḥmad b. ʿĪsā's Amālī, quoting al-Qāsim, ʿAlī, and Abū Jaʿfar, addresses the impurity which polytheists and Magians transmit to the fish they touch but indicates that Jews and Christians do not have such an effect upon fish. 40 Recall that Zayd and Aḥmad both distinguish People of the Book from other non-Muslims with respect to the permissibility of their acts of ritual slaughter; they-and, it seems, al-Qāsim-apparently distinguish People of the Book from other nonMuslims with respect to their purity status as well. Of the authorities examined in this study, the first Zaydī to declare that People of the Book are impure is al-Hādī ilā al-Ḥaqq (d. 298/911), who condemns 39) Zayd b. ʿAlī (Majmūʿ al-fiqh 13, §55) forbids the performance of ablutions with the run-off from a polytheist's ablution; curiously, Zayd distinguishes between the run-off (suʾr) from a polytheist's ablution and the leftover liquid (also suʾr) in a vessel from which he has drunk, prohibiting the latter only when the polytheist has recently consumed wine or pork. On the subject of suʾr, which according to most authorities consistently bears the purity status of the person or animal associated with it, see Maghen, "Close Encounters," 359-64. Abū ʿAbd Allāh prohibits the consumption of food associated with People of the Book on the grounds that "wine and pork are in their dishes"; in another ḥadīth, he allows a convert to Islam to use the dishes of his Christian family members because, the convert said, they do not consume pork. 44 Traditions like these closely resemble those found in Sunni sources, which regularly express concern about the fact that nonMuslim and, especially, Magian dishes or cookware may contain trace remnants of pork or wine. 45 In an especially striking ḥadīth that directly contradicts some of the Zaydī statements we have encountered and resembles a statement of the eminent Sunni jurist Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan al-Shaybānī (d. 189/805), Abū ʿAbd Allāh declares that pickles prepared by Magians and fish caught by Magians are entirely unproblematic. 46 If the impurity that afflicts Magians is communicable, it would surely affect moist foodstuffs such as pickles and fish! The presence of such a ḥadīth in both the Maḥāsin and Ibn Bābawayh's Faqīh testifies to the fact that at least some Shiʿi tradents regarded this attitude toward non-Muslims and their foodstuffs to be authentic and authoritative. Alongside ḥadīths that display concern about the impure foodstuffs consumed by non-Muslims, al-Barqī's Maḥāsin contains several traditions that, like their Zaydī counterparts, appear to regard the impurity of non-Muslims themselves to be the problem. 47 Abū ʿAbd Allāh twice expresses his opposition to commensality with Magians, even when consuming food prepared by a Muslim; in a third tradition, he prohibits eating the food of Jews, Christians, or Magians. 48 In a fourth ḥadīth, Abū ʿAbd Allāh forbids eating out of the same bowl as a Magian, sleeping on the same couch as a Magian, and shaking a Magian's hand; the version of this tradition found in another collection refers to both Magians and Jews. 49 These statements evidently presume that at least some non-Muslims are afflicted by a highly contagious form of impurity, communicable to foodstuffs and to Muslims by direct and even indirect contact.
The nature of the impurity that afflicts non-Muslims becomes apparent in another statement found in the Maḥāsin, Kāfī, and Faqīh. Asked about the permissibility of sharing a meal with Jews, Christians, or Magians, Abū ʿAbd Allāh replied, "If they eat from your food and they perform ritual ablutions, then there is no harm."
50 If the performance 47) In addition to the traditions discussed below, two ḥadīths in this chapter report that the Imāms understand "the food of those who were given the Book" to refer to "grains"; see n. 28. of a purificatory ablution can remove the impurity associated with one's non-Muslim dining partners, then this impurity must not be intrinsic but rather acquired through the circumstances of daily life. This tradition seems to understand non-Muslims as being similar to Muslims who have recently experienced an event that induces a state of ḥadath impurity (e.g., sleep, urination, menstruation). It suggests that nonMuslims are impure simply because they are unlikely to perform the requisite ablutions of their own accord. 51 A related possibility is that Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq imagines non-Muslims and their foodstuffs as likely to be affected by intrinsically impure (najis) substances such as pork and wine. In either case, the impurity associated with non-Muslims by this tradition-and, quite possibly, its less explicit counterparts-stems not from the identity of non-Muslims but rather from their behavior. One may infer from this tradition that a non-Muslim is not inherently najis but lives in a state of impurity due to regular consumption of najis substances or the failure to perform ablutions after ḥadath-inducing events. It was precisely on account of non-Muslim practices, we have already seen, that pre-5th/11th-century sources condemn the consumption of meat prepared by non-Muslim butchers.
There is, however, a logical flaw in the assertion that non-Muslims suffer from a communicable form of acquired impurity on account of their actions or inactions: the impurity which Muslims experience in the same circumstances is not contagious. Shiʿis, like their Sunni counterparts, hold that Muslims, even those in a major state of ḥadath impurity (junub), can never render anything else impure; for this reason, Muslims in a state of impurity are free to touch both foodstuffs and other Muslims. 52 The implications of the impurity that afflicts nonMuslims are thus inconsistent within the broader framework of Shiʿi 11th/17th-century Muḥammad Bāqir al-Majlisī; on the latter, see Maghen, "Strangers and Brothers," 186. 51) is explanation of non-Muslim impurity as circumstantial rather than intrinsic corresponds to the dominant trend in Sunni discourse on this subject; see Maghen, "Strangers and Brothers," 201-22. 52) On Sunni attitudes regarding the non-communicability of the impurity that affects Muslims, see Maghen, "Close encounters." No comparable study of Shiʿi attitudes exists, but the statements on this subject I have encountered within Shiʿi sources conform to the paradigm described by Maghen. See, for example, Kāfī, 3: 10, §1; Istibṣār, 1: 16-18, § §30-35.
conceptions of impurity. Perhaps this inconsistency is the reason why Muḥammad al-Mufīd, whom Hossein Modarressi describes as a "rationalist" in his approach to ḥadīth interpretation, makes no reference to the prohibition of non-meat foodstuffs associated with foreigners.
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Quite the contrary: in his discussions of non-Muslim acts of ritual slaughter, al-Mufīd explains the permission of "the food of those who were given the Book" in Q. 5.5 as referring not to meat but rather to "breads and nourishing grains" or "their grains and dairy pro ducts." 54 The preparation of bread and dairy products, like that of pickles and fish, involves contact with moist foodstuffs susceptible to contracting communicable forms of impurity.
Al-Mufīd, moreover, justifies the prohibition of Magian food and dishes on the grounds that Magians regularly consume carrion and impure foodstuffs, a statement he follows with a detailed account of the degree to which trace elements of wine and other prohibited ingredients render other foods impure. 55 He does not claim that Magian food is impure on account of the impurity of its preparers. Al-Mufīd prohibits the performance of ablutions with the suʾr of "unbelievers: polytheists, Jews, Christians, Magians, or Sabians," a clear indication that he regards non-Muslims to be impure in some fashion. 56 Nevertheless, al-Mufīd also embraces the argument that the problem with nonMuslim foodstuffs stems not from the communicability of this impurity to the foodstuffs but rather from the fact that these foodstuffs might be affected by the forbidden foods which non-Muslims consume.
Al-Mufīd appears to be either unwilling to endorse the assertion that the impurity of non-Muslims is communicable to foodstuffs or unable to provide reasoned justification for this assertion. His student, ʿAlī b. al-Ḥusayn al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā, does just that in the Intiṣār, a defense of Imāmī norms distinct from those of the Sunnis. Al-Murtaḍā, in a deceptively simple statement, justifies the Imāmī contention that "all food touched by an unbeliever (kāfir)-a Jew, a Christian, or anyone else whose unbelief has been established with clear evidence-is prohibited" by citing the Qurʾanic prooftext "truly, the polytheists are impure (najas)" (Q. 9.28). Non-Muslims, al-Murtaḍā explains, are intrinsically impure (najis) in a literal and not merely a figurative sense, and for that reason food touched by non-Muslims becomes impure. The reason non-Muslims are impure is that they embrace false beliefs (kufr); recall that al-Murtaḍā, following in the footsteps of his teacher, also cites the false beliefs of non-Muslims to justify the prohibition of acts of ritual slaughter by non-Muslims. As for those who object that Q. 5.5 permits food touched by foreigners, al-Murtaḍā explains that one must understand the verse as referring solely to pure foodstuffs, like grains; just as the verse surely does not permit eating pork, it does not permit eating other impure foods either.
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Al-Murtaḍā's argument elegantly justifies the restrictive statements found in earlier Shiʿi sources, but what makes it so brilliant is the way that it reframes those statements in a wholly original manner. The ḥadīths we have examined express concern about impure substances such as pork and wine or about the behaviors that cause non-Muslims themselves to be in a state of impurity susceptible to amelioration through ablutions. Al-Murtaḍā, in contrast, asserts that the impurity of non-Muslims addressed in these sources is actually intrinsic to nonMuslims on account of their false beliefs. When earlier authorities interpret Q. 5.5 as referring to "grains and the like," they use grain as an example of a non-meat foodstuff, "food that does not have the breath of life" in the words of the Īḍāḥ. Al-Murtaḍā redeploys this traditional interpretation as a reference to foods that are not susceptible to contracting impurity, namely natural foodstuffs that remain dry and unprocessed. He conveniently overlooks earlier statements, including those of al-Mufīd, which allow Muslim consumption of moist or processed foods such as fruit, fish, bread, and dairy products.
Al-Murtaḍā's use of Q. 9.28 to account for the impurity of nonMuslim foodstuffs is, to my knowledge, unprecedented within Imāmī 57) 193, [10] [11] literature. The turn-of-the-4th/10th-century exegetes ʿAlī b. Ibrāhīm al-Qummī and Muḥammad b. Masʿūd al-ʿAyyāshī, both of whom take a stand against the permissibility of non-Muslim meat in their commentaries on Q. 5.5, devote no attention in their commentaries to Q. 9.28, presumably because they had nothing to say about this verse. 58 Although a number of ḥadīths report that the Imāms directly addressed such verses as Q. 5.5, Q. 6.118, and Q. 6.121, Imāmī collections contain no reports that cite Q. 9.28; works by al-Mufīd do not cite this verse either. 59 Third/ninth-and 4th/10th-century sources, moreover, never refer to People of the Book as "polytheists" (mushrikūn); al-Mufīd's treatise on Jewish and Christian ritual slaughter is the earliest work we have examined that equates People of the Book and polytheists on account of their equally false beliefs. 60 References to nonMuslims as najis are also absent from pre-5th/11th-century Imāmī sources, although such references can be found in Zaydī literature beginning with the work of al-Hādī ilā al-Ḥaqq. 61 Al-Murtaḍā is the first authority to articulate all of the core com ponents of the classical Shiʿi doctrine regarding the impurity of non-Muslims: as demonstrated by the Qurʾanic dictum "truly, the polytheists are impure," all non-Muslims are impure, their impurity is contagious, and the cause of their impurity is the falsehood of nonMuslim beliefs. Al-Murtaḍā's colleague, al-Ṭūsī, incorporates these elements into his own writings on the subject of non-Muslim impurity, as do subsequent Imāmī and Zaydī authorities. Al-Ṭūsī, alluding to both Q. 9.28 and 5.5, expresses this notion as follows: "All food which unbelievers handle or touch with their bodies is not permitted for consumption; because they are impure (anjās), food becomes polluted (yanjas) through their contact with it. God has been lenient in the permission of using grain and similar foods that do not contract impurity (najāsa) even when [non-Muslims] touch them with their hands." 62 Unlike most of their classical Sunni counterparts, who treat the impurity of non-Muslims within the same conceptual framework they apply to the impurity that afflicts Muslims, Shiʿi authorities come to understand the impurity of non-Muslims as analogous to that of impure substances such as urine, wine, dogs, and pigs. There are, however, two important distinctions between the impurity of these substances and that of non-Muslims. Contact with the former does not necessitate the performance of an ablution, merely the removal of the offending substance; contact with a non-Muslim, in contrast, apparently constitutes a polluting ḥadath event that nullifies a prior state of purity. 63 A more significant distinction is that, whereas nothing can eliminate the impurity of a dog or a pig, the impurity of a non-Muslim can be eliminated through the transformation of that non-Muslim into a Muslim. Thus, al-Ṭūsī distinguishes between liquid from which a Jew drank before converting to Islam and liquid from which he drank afterwards: the former is impure and the latter pure. 64 The fact that the impurity afflicting non-Muslims vanishes the moment they accept true faith in God as revealed by His Prophet, Muḥammad, indicates clearly that the source of non-Muslim impurity is the falsehood of non-Muslim beliefs. The only other intrinsically impure entity whose status is contingent is mayta, the meat of an animal whose death does not result from a valid act of ritual slaughter. This is no mere coincidence: as we have seen, Shiʿi authorities from the time of al-Mufīd onward hold that the distinction between mayta and permissible meat also correlates to the validity of the butcher's beliefs. 65 Orthodoxy constitutes the defining attribute of identity in classical Shiʿi law.
Why are Shiʿi norms regarding non-Muslim food and impurity distinctive?
Classical Sunni and Shiʿi sources offer fundamentally different interpretations of Qurʾanic verses regarding the impurity of non-Muslims and the permissibility of their foodstuffs. We have seen, however, that Shiʿis do not maintain "narrow-minded old conceptions" which Sunnis sensibly discarded, as Goldziher asserts.
The classical Shiʿi doctrine regarding non-Muslim impurity, no less than the classical Sunni doctrine on this subject examined by other scholars, emerged over time and reached its present form only in the early 5th/11th century. 66 Shiʿi appeals to Q. 9.28 as a prooftext for their notions of non-Muslim impurity, moreover, first appear only at the culmination of this historical process. Factors other than the Qurʾan itself, therefore, must underlie the emergence of the distinctive Shiʿi a similar distinction between current and former Jews and Christians in order to account for ḥadīths that permit meat prepared by People of the Book; see n. 38. Western scholars, again following in Goldziher's footsteps, commonly point to Zoroastrian influence as a significant, if not primary, factor underlying the distinctive aspects of Shiʿi notions regarding the impurity of non-Muslims. 67 Although there are similarities between Zoroastrian and Shiʿi ideas on this subject-authorities from both communities posit that all religious foreigners suffer a communicable form of impurity that affects the foods they touch-the argument that Shiʿi authorities "borrowed" from their Zoroastrian counterparts carries no explanatory force. Shiʿi authorities, after all, reject the Zoroastrian contention that all human beings, insiders no less than outsiders, are subject to contagious impurity: there is no Shiʿi counterpart to Zoroastrian regulations that prevent temporarily impure Zoroastrians from touching food which pure Zoroastrians will subsequently consume. Positing Zoroastrian influence, therefore, still leaves us unable to explain Shiʿi notions regarding impurity in any detail. This hypothesis, moreover, begs the crucial question: Why were Shiʿi authorities-for the most part Arabs boasting lengthy Islamic lineages-receptive to Zoroastrian ideas about impurity while Sunnis, who constituted the majority of Muslims in regions formerly dominated by Zoroastrianism, rejected these ideas entirely? 68 We must look within Islamic thought itself to account for the differences between Sunni and Shiʿi attitudes toward non-Muslims.
As a manifestation of what he calls Shiʿism's "irrationality" and "theology of hate and intolerance," Goldziher adduces the Shiʿi maxim "that, in doubtful cases, where the sources of religious law furnish no criterion for a firm decision, one must on principle do the opposite of what the Sunnis hold to be correct." 69 Setting aside the bias dripping from Goldziher's observation, we may reasonably regard difference for difference's sake as a plausible factor shaping the emergence of distinctly Shiʿi norms regarding the food and impurity of non-Muslims. By this logic, Shiʿi statements regarding the impurity of non-Muslims constitute reactions to and pointed rejections of the argument by Muḥammad b. Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī (d. 204/820) against branding non-Muslims as categorically impure, the argument which came to dominate Sunni discourse on this subject. 70 It may, after all, be no coincidence that the earliest attestations of both the blanket prohibition of non-Muslim meat (the Īḍāḥ) and the assertion that non-Muslims are intrinsically impure (al-Murtaḍā's al-Intiṣār) appear in works of anti-Sunni polemic. Al-Mufīd, moreover, highlights the contrast between the position of the Shiʿis and "the consensus of Sunnis hostile to the Imāms" (jamāʿat al-nāṣibiyya) in the context of justifying dissimulation with respect to animal slaughter performed by Jews and Christians. 71 Shiʿi discourse about the impurity of non-Muslims and impermissibility of their acts of animal slaughter highlights the accuracy of Shiʿi understandings of consume non-Muslim foodstuffs demonstrates the dubious nature of their Islamic credentials.
The principle of intentional opposition to Sunni norms accounts in part for the distinctiveness of Shiʿi attitudes toward the food and impurity of non-Muslims. We have seen, however, that these Shiʿi attitudes also reflect the notions that all non-Muslims are equivalent and, ultimately, that all non-Muslims espouse false beliefs. The difference between Sunni and Shiʿi ideas on these subjects cannot be explained as a function of mere knee-jerk reactionism. Rather, Sunni and Shiʿi ideas regarding People of the Book and their beliefs serve to express fundamentally different conceptions of the Islamic community itself.
The Sunni practice of distinguishing People of the Book from other non-Muslims by ascribing true beliefs to Jews and Christians advances a particularly Sunni conception of Islamic identity. By granting limited legitimacy to Jewish and Christian theology, Sunnis enlarge the community of consensus with respect to certain core principles of Islam, including monotheism and the communication of God's will through scriptures revealed to prophets. Recall that the self-definition of those who call themselves ahl al-sunna waʾl-jamāʿa rests in no small measure on the notion of consensus. Ascription of correct beliefs to Jews and Christians, moreover, bolsters Sunni claims with respect to the authority vested in the community of Muslims: if even Jews and Christians possess true knowledge, how much the more so must Muslims possess such knowledge, especially those who lived during the time of the Prophet! The permission of meat from animals slaughtered by Jews and Christians thus symbolically reinforces the "big tent" conceptions regarding communal identity and the diffusion of knowledge endorsed by Sunnis.
Shiʿi assertions that People of the Book are equivalent to other nonMuslims and, especially, that Jewish and Christian beliefs are false serve to undermine the "big tent" conceptions of Islam espoused by Sunnis in favor of an elitest model. Indeed, these assertions advance a distinctly Shiʿi understanding of Islam: true knowledge of God and the divine will is accessible only through the esoteric teachings revealed to the Imāms. The delegitimation of Jewish and Christian beliefs on the grounds that non-Muslims lack true knowledge of God furthers efforts to delegitimize the knowledge possessed by Sunnis and the merits of popular consensus (ijmāʿ) as a source of knowledge. Thus, when al-Mufīd refers disparagingly to jamāʿat al-nāṣibiyya, "the consensus of Sunnis hostile to the Imāms," he challenges the validity of ijmāʿ itself: if the Imāms possess the truth, of what value is widespread opinion to the contrary? The equation of People of the Book and polytheists, moreover, lays the groundwork for the more incendiary-and, thus, less frequently articulated-equation of Sunnis hostile to the Imāms and polytheists: those who reject the authority of the Imāms, by definition, do not truly believe in God. 75 The distillation of this constellation of Shiʿi notions regarding nonMuslims as deriving from a single Qurʾanic verse is stunning in its simplicity. Perhaps we should not be surprised that such an interpretation, and the ideas that underpin it, took time to develop. The classical Shiʿi interpretation of Q. 9.28, one might say, is like a pearl that emerges at the end of considerable scholarly efforts to address an irritant to their intellectual system, in this case the troublesome status of Jews and Christians within Shiʿi thought. 76 Examination of early Shiʿi discourse regarding the food and impurity of these non-Muslims reveals how and why this particular pearl came into being. 
